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Abstract 
Consumer willingness-to-pay (WTP) for Fairtrade products is an important topic in international 
economics that examines the demand side of the market for ethically sourced goods. Under 
Fairtrade, consumers who buy labeled products typically pay more than market prices and some 
portion of this price premium goes towards bettering the terms of trade for producers who are 
considered marginalized. The purpose of this research will be to examine how consumer WTP for 
Fairtrade products changes under different pricing given the introduction of new information 
regarding the accounting of tariffs in the price premium. This paper also seeks to examine the 
relationship between charity and consumer utility and how much consumers are willing to pay for 
a Fairtrade product before deciding that the price premium is not justified. Additionally, this paper 
will use consumer choice and demand as a way of determining whether consumers exhibit faith in 
the government to resolve global socioeconomic issues. The results from the statistical and 
economic models I present show that consumers already have a preference for the Fairtrade 
product under a system of no information other than price and label, that this preference 
strengthens after being presented with a price breakdown of import tax and producer contribution 
amount, and that this preference becomes even greater when told that the US government will use 
the tax revenue towards international development programs. The warm glow effect and the utility 
consumers receive from making a charitable purchase is also pronounced, and consumers also 
indicate a considerable trust for the government through their market choices.  
 
Motivation 
This paper seeks to contribute to the literature focusing on the demand side of Fairtrade and how 
consumers change their behavior and consumption choices under varying information levels in the 
market. The scope of the paper is not limited to Fairtrade and many of the mechanisms discussed 
can be applied to the greater span of consumer markets. The topics I discuss are relevant in various 
subdisciplines of economics including international development and behavioral economics.  
The nature of Fairtrade products makes a thorough discussion without references to international 
trade difficult. On the supply side of this market, Fairtrade goods are sourced outside of the United 
States or developed regions in general and part of the revenue generated from them is for the 
benefit of economically disadvantaged producers in developing areas of the world.1 On the demand 
side, most consumers of Fairtrade products are from developed countries, where they have more 
                                                             
1 Sarcauga, “History of Fair Trade.” 
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disposable income and have more freedom to choose between a Fairtrade labeled good and cheaper 
market alternatives.2 For this reason, this is a market that necessarily spans across countries. The 
improvement of economic conditions of disadvantaged producers is the motive that underpins the 
very existence of the Fairtrade label. Analysis of this market using aspects from trade is thus a 
natural next step in the research which can help answer questions about the demand in this market.  
There are other reasons why analysis from a trade perspective is useful. One reason is that it can 
be used as a tool to explore imperfect information in consumer markets. The success of programs 
like Fairtrade depends on consumers buying products with their label, but consumers need to have 
a justification for paying a higher premium for a Fairtrade good over a cheaper market alternative. 
This justification is in the form of contributions from the revenue to the disadvantaged producers 
participating in the program. The imperfect information lies in the question of how much of this 
premium gets transferred to the producers, which may not be immediately apparent when making 
the purchase, and how much goes towards administrative or other miscellaneous factors such as 
taxes. Exploiting the fact that these Fairtrade goods are typically imported from developing 
countries allows us to use mechanisms such as import tax to examine how consumer preferences 
change with different information about price breakdown of the product.  
Tariffs are a useful tool to help answer questions about consumer behavior in the Fairtrade market, 
and this will be the main focus of the paper. These results could possibly be extended more 
generally to apply to all markets. The underlying mechanism at work here is the balance of charity 
and the price of a product in consumers’ utility from buying a Fairtrade good. Fairtrade labeled 
products have a price premium attached to them since a portion of the price goes to supporting the 
producers of the product.3 Consumers who buy Fairtrade goods typically do so because they are 
willing to pay a little extra knowing that the extra money will go to the producers and improve 
their economic conditions. As such, charity is factored into their utility because despite the 
negative relationship between price and utility, consumers who buy Fairtrade products ultimately 
choose them over cheaper market alternatives because they get increased utility from doing 
something considered charitable, in a phenomenon known as the warm glow effect.4 If, instead, 
consumers were told that a portion of this price premium was the result of a tariff on the imported 
product, they might reconsider their choices. Given no additional information, any money that 
goes towards a tariff is money that is not going to the producers who are supposed to be the 
beneficiaries of the Fairtrade premium. The portion of the price premium going towards a tariff 
thus would get switched over from the “charity side” of a consumer’s mental formula to the “price 
side.” In this way, tariffs can be used to analyze the tradeoff between charity and price, and at what 
point consumers think it is no longer worth it to choose a Fairtrade product over a market 
alternative.  
Another usefulness of the tariff mechanism is to understand whether people have a lot of faith in 
the government relative to the free market when it comes to addressing issues such as global 
poverty and other economic problems in the world. If consumers are given a simple price 
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3 Fairtrade Foundation, “Fairtrade Premium.” 
4 Andreoni, "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving."  
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breakdown consisting of how much money goes towards producers and how much goes towards 
import tax and are later told that the government will use the tax revenue to fund international 
development aid, their changes in preference for a Fairtrade product can tell us whether they 
believe the government’s efforts to solve these global socioeconomic issues are effective. 
Although a simple question, this roundabout analysis can possibly answer this question more 
effectively than if one were to simply ask consumers whether they trust the government to solve 
these issues, as their market activity and demand would ultimately indicate how they would choose 
to use their money and whether they believe in the viability of these initiatives. This methodology 
serves as a market-based way of obtaining information about consumer beliefs based on how their 
demand moves in response to changes in the market.  
Among prior literature, one important paper that discusses the consumer side of the Fairtrade 
market is a study by Hainmueller et al, which concludes that there is substantial consumer support 
for Fairtrade labels, although there is heterogeneity in WTP for those labeled products due to 
varying elasticities of demand.5 Their study analyzes consumer responsiveness to changes in price 
of Fair Trade-labeled products relative to non-labeled products, but they do not analyze this 
responsiveness under varying information schemes that reveal more about how price premiums 
over market alternatives are determined. 
Another important paper that serves as a basis for the questions I discuss is a study by Basu and 
Hicks, which explores how WTP changes when consumers are given more information about the 
performance of the Fairtrade program and how much income is guaranteed to the producers.6 The 
results from that paper showed that WTP increased with increasing income gains to the producer 
until reaching a certain point and dropping off afterwards. This paper seeks to incorporate a similar 
but different mechanism by adding information on both producer contribution dollar amounts as 
well as import tax amounts included in the purchase, the latter serving as a deadweight loss 
component to answer the questions about the price vs. charity tradeoff and exploring how much 
faith consumers have in the government.  
 
Methodology 
I conduct a discrete choice experiment administered through Qualtrics to the population of internet 
users between October 2017 and February 2018. The survey was distributed to various online 
communities across different platforms including Facebook, Reddit, Discord (specifically servers 
with American and European users), and survey distribution sites such as SurveyCircle and 
SwapSurvey. A total of 77 fully completed responses were recorded and used in this study.  
Using the response data obtained, I use conditional and multinomial logit econometric models to 
analyze how people’s preferences for shirts shifted given changes in price and information about 
tariffs. I presented respondents with a choice between two shirts: a shirt made in Nicaragua with a 
                                                             
5 Hainmueller, Hiscox, and Sequeira, “Consumer Demand for the Fair Trade Label: Evidence from a Multi-Store 
Field Experiment.” 
6 Basu and Hicks, “Label Performance and the Willingness to Pay for Fair Trade Coffee: A Cross- National 
Perspective.” 
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Fairtrade label on it and a shirt made in USA with no label. Before presenting the shirt options, I 
provided a brief summary of Fairtrade and its mission. A third opt-out option was included so that 
respondents would not feel forced to pick a shirt they did not prefer. These choice questions were 
broken down into three sections with different levels of information presented, and the survey 
itself was designed to prevent respondents from returning to previous sections to change their 
answers. The first information regime consisted of three questions which only presented 
information about the shirts’ country of origin, labels, and price; price was the only characteristic 
that was altered. The price of the US/no label shirt remained constant at $7.99 while the 
Nicaraguan/Fairtrade shirt was priced at $8.49, $8.99, and $9.99 beginning with the lowest price 
presented first. Throughout all information regimes, the Nicaraguan shirt was always priced higher 
than the US shirt, with a $8.49 minimum. Maintaining this price premium was necessary to reflect 
the fact that consumers are paying extra for a product that promises to contribute to an ethical 
cause; the premium essentially represents the charitable component of such a purchase.  
The second information scheme consisted of five questions and introduced a new breakdown of 
the price of the Nicaraguan shirt. In this section, respondents were told that a certain portion of the 
price of this shirt goes towards an import tax while another specified portion is the amount that the 
producer is actually receiving from the purchase. The method I used to determine what these dollar 
amounts should be was taking the price difference between the US and Nicaraguan shirts and 
alternating between a 30% or 60% tariff on this difference. As a result, these choices included 
shirts where the dollar tax amount was greater than the contribution to the producer as well as 
shirts where the contributed amount was greater than the tax amount. Similar to the first 
information regime, the price of the Nicaraguan shirt increased with each choice and as such, both 
price level and tariff/contribution amount were variable characteristics in this regime. 
The third information regime had the exact same questions as the second regime, except 
respondents were now told that the US government was going to use the revenue from the tariff 
towards international development and aid programs. The price and tariff levels alternated in the 
same amounts as in the second information regime; the only difference between these two regimes 
was the additional information about how the tax revenue was to be used.  
I chose shirts as opposed to another commodity because it fit the two most important criteria I had 
when developing the survey. The first criterion was the universalness of the product. I had to 
choose a product that was a common purchase across most types of consumers—not too expensive 
and considered enough of a necessity that most people would not elect to opt out of buying one. 
Clothing was a suitable choice for this and shirts in particular are more neutral with respect to 
consumer characteristics such as gender, relative to other articles of clothing such as pants. The 
second criterion was the substitutability of the product. The products that I chose must be 
considered as close to perfect substitutes as possible with respect to certain characteristics and 
attributes beyond the ones I specify. An example of a good that would not fit this criterion is coffee. 
If a consumer is presented with a choice between American coffee and Nicaraguan coffee, their 
choice would likely not only be influenced by characteristics I have specified such as price or label, 
but by other attributes such as quality, resulting in unobserved heterogeneity in the data. Coffees 
from different geographical locations have different reputations among consumers based on factors 
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such as taste, and it would not be unreasonable to expect that there would be bias towards coffee 
from one of the two countries depending on which type of coffee the consumer prefers based on 
these outside characteristics. Shirts could perhaps experience such a bias as well (e.g. consumers 
might believe one is inherently of higher quality than the other based on where it is made), but it 
would be on a much smaller scale especially since shirts are not necessarily a luxury good and are 
more of a necessity than a product such as coffee.  
The research itself was designed specifically to target consumers in developed countries, but the 
questions themselves are constructed from a US-specific perspective. The prices of the two shirts  
are after-tax prices, but an import tax is only applied to the Nicaraguan shirt and the US shirt takes 
the position of being the “domestic” shirt with no additional tax. I designed the questions like this 
rather than having entire country blocks (e.g. US and EU countries) that would represent a wider 
range of consumers from developed countries because it is more straightforward and less 
convoluted. Product labels typically only include one country of origin (e.g. “Made in USA”), so 
it would not be practical to include a shirt option that represented multiple developed countries. 
Furthermore, the issue of how the tax revenue is to be used involves a specific national 
government’s budget and in order to incorporate scenarios from multiple developed countries, I 
would have had to add many more shirt options. Additionally incorporating the tariff mechanism 
and having specific tariffs apply to respective consumers across different countries would have 
made the survey much too long and too impractical for people to want to complete it. The way the 
survey was written did not necessarily exclude consumers outside the United States from taking it 
because the scenario and choices were outlined in such a way that a consumer living outside the 
US would hypothetically assume they were buying in the US market (e.g. the specification that all 
prices listed were in terms of USD and the lack of an import tax on the US shirt). I later present 
additional results excluding consumers outside of the US to show that the findings remain robust. 
 
Empirical Strategy and Findings 
Summary Statistics 
The survey sample consisted of 77 responses multiplied by 2 t-shirt choices and 13 choice 
questions for a total of 2002 observations. Of these, 116 observations were dropped due to opt-
outs, leaving 1886 observations overall. As shown in Figure 1a in the appendix, 51% of the 
respondents were male while 49% were female. 90% of all respondents were not members of a 
human rights group (Figure 1b). A majority of respondents (57%) were in the 18-24 year old age 
group, followed by 19% in the 25-30 year old group, 13% in the 40+ year old group, and 10% in 
31-39 year old group (Figure 1c). Finally, among demographic information, the educational 
background of respondents is shown in Figure 1d. The majority of respondents had at least some 
college experience. 36% had completely as far as a 4-year degree while 27% had some college or 
a 2-year degree, and 21% had a postgraduate degree. 14% of respondents had obtained as far as a 
high school diploma or equivalent and 1% had less than high school.  
The survey also obtained information about respondents’ views on social issues as well as their 
consumer background. Figure 2 in the appendix shows the distribution of the social issues that 
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respondents care about. The vast majority of respondents care about issues such as fair labor 
standards and workplace safety, child labor, poverty and inequality, animal cruelty, and whether 
products were ethically sourced. A smaller portion of respondents (21%) cared about supporting 
American-made goods while 5% did not care about any of these issues. Figure 3 shows how 
respondents rated the importance of certain factors when making a purchasing decision. 85% said 
that the price being as low as possible was moderately, very, or extremely important. At the same 
time, roughly 79% (accounting for rounding errors) indicated that proceeds of the purchase going 
towards disadvantaged producers was moderately, very, or extremely important. In contrast, over 
half the respondents indicated that it was of no importance that the shirt is made in USA. 
Respondents’ familiarity with the Fairtrade label was very diverse, as Figure 4 shows. About a 
quarter of respondents were not at all familiar with the label and only about 14% were extremely 
familiar with it. The overall responses tended to be skewed towards unfamiliarity with the label 
rather than complete familiarity. Regarding consumer habits, there is a wide variation in both 
budget and number of shirt purchases. Figure 5 shows respondents’ annual budgets for purchasing 
shirts, where the largest group—about 31%—has a budget of $100-$300. About 69% of 
respondents purchase between 2 to 7 shirts annually and 25% purchase more than 7 shirts a year, 
indicating that shirts are a fairly common purchase among most respondents (Figure 6).  
 
Statistical Models 
For the regression portion of the data, I use three separate logistical models to cross-check the 
results with each other. The first category consists of four conditional logistical models that use 
dummy variables. The second category consists of three conditional logistical models, but without 
the use of any dummy variables. The third category consists of three classic multinomial logistical 
models without the use of any dummy variables. All three categories use Choice as the dependent 
variable with the shirt attributes—Price, Tariff Level, and Country of Origin—as the independent 
variables. The Label of the shirt is omitted from the models because of collinearity since the same 
label is attached to the same corresponding country of origin in every question.  
In the first category with dummy variable conditional logistical models, the data I discuss is 
divided into two subsets. In the first subset, I explore how shirt preferences change from the first 
information regime to the second regime. This seeks to answer how the likelihood of picking one 
of the shirts changes when I first present the breakdown of import tax amount and contribution to 
the producer. In the second subset of the analysis, I explore how shirt preferences change from the 
second information regime to the third. The underlying question in this portion is how the 
likelihood of choosing the same shirt changes when I present information on how the tax revenue 
is to be used by the government.  
Each subset of the analysis includes two different models. In the first subset, the first model 
regresses Choice on Price, Tariff, and Made in Nicaragua. Since each observation is one possible 
choice in the shirt questions, they are grouped by ID corresponding to the respondent making the 
choice. The observations are limited to the questions corresponding to the first and second 
information regimes since these are the regimes discussed in the first subset of the analysis. In the 
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survey, questions 3, 4, and 5 correspond to the first information regime, questions 6-10 correspond 
to the second regime, and questions 11-15 correspond to the third regime. Observations are filtered 
accordingly. Thus the first model in Stata follows the form: 
 
       Choice = β1Price + β2Tariff + β3Nicaragua if Question ≤ 10, group(ID)           (1) 
 
To analyze how the likelihood of choosing the Nicaraguan shirt changes from the first to the second 
information regime, the second model additionally includes an Information dummy variable where 
0 indicates that the choice question belongs to the first regime and 1 indicates that it belongs to the 
second regime. 
  
          Choice = β1Price + β2Tariff + β3Nicaragua + β4Info1 if Question ≤ 10, group(ID)      (2) 
 
Each coefficient signifies the likelihood of choosing a shirt with that particular attribute. The 
coefficient of interest in both models is β3 and in order to answer the question of how the likelihood 
of choosing the Made in Nicaragua shirt changes, I look to see how this coefficient changes in 
magnitude from the first to the second model after the inclusion of the Information dummy 
variable.  
The models of the second subset are similar to those of the first with the exception of the questions 
and observations involved and the inclusion of a different Information dummy variable. Since this 
second subset deals with the second and third information regimes, observations from questions 
3, 4, and 5 are filtered out. The first model is: 
 
        Choice = β1Price + β2Tariff + β3Nicaragua if Question ≥ 6, group(ID)          (3) 
 
The second model includes a different Information dummy variable than the model from the first 
subset. In this new variable, observations from the second information regime take on a value of 
0 while observations from the third regime take on a value of 1.  
 
         Choice = β1Price + β2Tariff + β3Nicaragua + β4Info2 if Question ≥ 6, group(ID)      (4) 
 
As with the first subset, the coefficient of interest is β3 to analyze how the likelihood of choosing 
the Made in Nicaragua shirt changes when I present information about how the import tax revenue 
from the shirt is to be used by the government.  
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In the second category of conditional logistical models with no dummy variables, I analyze each 
of the three information regimes separately. Each model regresses Choice on the different shirt 
characteristics, and I compare the coefficient on Made in Nicaragua to analyze how the likelihood 
of choosing the shirt changes across the three regimes. The three models corresponding to each of 
the three information regimes are as follows: 
 
      Choice = β1Price + β2Nicaragua if Question ≤ 5, group(ID)              (5) 
 
Choice = β1Price + β2Tariff + β3Nicaragua if Question ≥ 6 & Question ≤ 10, group(ID)    (6)   
 
                  Choice = β1Price + β2Tariff + β3Nicaragua if Question ≥ 11, group(ID) (7) 
 
The model corresponding to the first information regime does not include the Tariff variable since 
that information was not provided to respondents with the set of questions in that choice group. 
Observations are filtered based on which questions correspond to the respective information 
regime: Questions 3-5 for the first regime, 6-10 for the second, and 11-15 for the third.  The 
coefficients of interest in this model set are β2 in model (5) and β3 in models (6) and (7). To analyze 
how preferences change, I compare these three coefficients and their significance levels to assess 
how the likelihood of choosing the Made in Nicaragua shirt changes through each regime. 
In the third and final category of models, I use three multinomial logistical models with the same 
regime breakdown as in the second model category which uses conditional logistical models. 
Observations are filtered the same way, with the only difference being that the multinomial logit 
models are not grouped by respondent: 
 
                                  Choice = β0 + β1Price + β2Nicaragua if Question ≤ 5 (8) 
 
         Choice = β0 + β1Price + β2Tariff + β3Nicaragua if Question ≥ 6 & Question ≤ 10 (9) 
 
                        Choice = β0 + β1Price + β2Tariff + β3Nicaragua if Question ≥ 11 (10) 
 
Mirroring the second model category, the coefficients of interest in this model set are β2 in model 
(8) and β3 in models (9) and (10). The changes in magnitude and/or direction of these coefficients 
will indicate how the likelihood of choosing the Made in Nicaragua shirt changes across the three 
information regimes.  
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There are a few reasons for using these different model types. The first two model groups provide 
two different ways to model the data using clogit. Clogit models choice as a function of the 
characteristics of the shirt options. This is useful for our purposes in this paper since all the 
independent variables are the shirt characteristics and we would like to know how the country/label 
characteristic influences respondents’ likelihood of choosing a shirt. Additionally, setting up one 
system to use dummy variables and another to model each information regime independently 
provides two different methods to use clogit to answer the question of interest. I follow these 
results with standard multinomial logit models for comparison purposes. In the following section, 
I show that results across all three model categories remain fairly consistent overall. 
 
Results 
I provide both clogit and mlogit estimates for comparison between the three types of models. I first 
discuss the results of the conditional logit models with dummy variables. Table 1 in the appendix 
shows the results regression (1) corresponding to the first data subset using only observations from 
the first and second information regimes. Beginning with Price, the negative and statistically 
significant coefficient at α=0.01 on the variable shows that all else held equal, the likelihood of 
choosing a shirt goes down with an increase in price. This is an expected and unsurprising result 
which helps indicate that the model is robust, as a positive coefficient would immediately make 
the model questionable. The coefficient on Tariff is small and negative, indicating that the 
likelihood of choosing a shirt goes down (though not by much) with an increase in the percentage 
of the tariff. However, this result is statistically insignificant. The coefficient on Nicaragua is 
positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating that a shirt has an increased likelihood of being 
chosen if it is Made in Nicaragua.  
Table 2 shows the results of regression (2), which adds the Information dummy variable. The 
coefficients on Price and Tariff do not change much except for a slight increase in magnitude; the 
direction still remains negative for both and Price is significant at the 1% level while Tariff remains 
statistically insignificant. The addition of the Info1 dummy variable and the subsequent change in 
the Nicaragua coefficient will indicate how preferences change. The coefficient on Nicaragua 
remains positive in direction and increases in magnitude. In other words, the introduction of 
information about tariffs increased respondents’ likelihood of picking the Made in Nicaragua shirt 
between the first and second information regimes.  
Tables 3 and 4 describe the results of the two models from the second data subset using only 
observations from the second and third information regimes. Table 3 shows the results of model 
(3). Similar to the previous models, Price and Tariff have negative coefficients except this time, 
the coefficients of both are statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus the likelihood of choosing 
a shirt goes down with an increase in price or tariff level, all else held equal. The coefficient on 
Nicaragua is again positive and significant at the 1% level.  
Table 4 shows how these results change with the addition of the Info2 dummy variable. The 
coefficients on Price and Tariff remain unchanged. Interestingly enough, the coefficient on 
Nicaragua also remains unchanged. The coefficients for all three are significant at the 1% level. 
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The data indicates that respondents’ preferences did not change when they were presented with 
additional information on how the import tax revenue was to be used by the government. One 
important detail to note is that the Nicaragua coefficient remains unchanged in the table produced 
by Stata due to rounding, as the original output provides estimates with more significant figures 
that show a very slight increase in preference that could be considered negligible in this model. 
To supplement these results, I also include the same four models shown except I replaced Made in 
Nicaragua with Made in USA to see how preference for the US shirt changes. Table 5 shows the 
results of model (1) with this change. It paints the same picture regarding Price and Tariff, with a 
negative and significant coefficient on Price and negative but insignificant coefficient on Tariff. 
However, while the coefficient of the Nicaraguan shirt was positive, the coefficient on the US shirt 
is negative, and significant at the 1% level. With the addition of the Info1 dummy variable in the 
second model, the US coefficient increases in magnitude, or becomes more negative (Table 6). 
The results of the second data subset also mirror the results of the models with the Nicaragua 
variable. The coefficient on USA remains negative and significant, and the addition of the Info2 
variable does not change its value when reported to three decimal places (Tables 7 and 8). These 
results support the ones obtained in the original models with the Nicaragua variable. While the 
likelihood of choosing a shirt that was Made in Nicaragua is positive, the likelihood of choosing a 
shirt that is Made in USA is negative. This is a result that does not change throughout all 
information regimes, and in fact the likelihood of choosing the Nicaraguan shirt increases and the 
likelihood of choosing the US shirt decreases with more information.  
As a final measure of thoroughness, I also run the same original four models limited to 
observations from respondents living in the US for the sake of comparing it to the larger overall 
dataset. Observations belonging to 26 of the original 77 respondents are filtered out. The results 
of these regressions are shown in Tables 9-12. As always, the coefficient on Price is negative and 
significant at the 1% level in all four models. However, despite Nicaragua having a positive 
coefficient, this result is statistically insignificant in the first two models which involve the first 
and second information regimes (Tables 9 and 10). In other words, between the first and second 
information regimes, US-residing respondents were effectively indifferent between the US and 
Nicaraguan shirts and presenting them with a breakdown of the Nicaraguan shirt’s price did not 
change this. One other interesting detail to note is that the addition of the Info1 dummy variable 
resulted in Tariff’s negative coefficient becoming statistically significant at the 10% level. 
Presenting US-residing respondents with the import tax breakdown of the Nicaraguan shirt 
resulted in the likelihood of a shirt with a higher tariff being chosen to decrease, a logical finding 
that works much the same way as an increase in general price. These results change in the last two 
models concerning the second and third information regimes (Tables 11 and 12). In both models, 
Price, Tariff, and Nicaragua are all statistically significant at the 1% level, with the coefficient on 
Price and Tariff negative and Nicaragua positive. Additionally, the inclusion of the Info2 dummy 
variable does not change the Nicaragua coefficient as it is reported in the table. Similar to the 
overall data pool, providing these respondents with information about how the import tax revenue 
is to be used does not significantly change their preference for the Nicaraguan shirt.  
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Next, I discuss the results of the second category of conditional logit models. The results of model 
(5) corresponding to the first information regime are shown in Table 13. The coefficient on Price 
is negative and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on Nicaragua is also positive and 
significant at the 5% level. In the results of the second information regime model in Table 14, 
coefficients on Price and Tariff are negative and significant at the 1% level (with the coefficient 
of Price decreasing in magnitude relative to the first information regime). The coefficient on 
Nicaragua increased in magnitude between the first and second information regimes, from 0.61 to 
1.79, now significant at the 1% level. Table 15 shows the results of the third information regime 
model. The coefficient on Price is still negative and significant at the 1% level (though it increased 
in magnitude relative to the second information regime) and Tariff is negative and significant at 
the 5% level, with a slight decrease in magnitude relative to the second information regime. Most 
importantly, the coefficient on Nicaragua is still positive and increased in magnitude even further, 
from 1.79 to 1.94, at a 1% significance level. There was a positive likelihood of respondents 
choosing the Nicaraguan shirt in the first information regime, which only increased with more 
information added in both the second and third regimes. The results of the first and second 
information regimes match the results obtained in the previous conditional logit models with 
dummy variables, however the results of this second set of models regarding the effects of the third 
information regime do not entirely match up with the results of the first set of models. In the first 
set of models, we concluded that there were no changes in preferences for the Nicaraguan shirt 
between the second and third information regimes. However, this set of models shows that there 
was a change in preferences, and that being provided information about how the government is to 
use the import tax revenue further increased respondents’ likelihood of choosing the Nicaraguan 
shirt.  
I also run these same conditional logit models restricted to respondents living in the US to check 
whether the results remain identical. Tables 16, 17, and 18 show the results of the first, second, 
and third information regime models, respectively. Within the first information regime, the 
likelihood of choosing the Nicaraguan shirt is still positive, however it is not statistically 
significant. In effect, US respondents were indifferent between the Nicaraguan and US shirts in 
the first information regime, though with a slight indication of possible preference for the 
Nicaraguan shirt. In the second information regime, the coefficient on the Nicaragua shirt 
increased to 1.35 and is significant at the 5% level. This coefficient increases yet again in the third 
information regime, from 1.35 to 1.49, at a new significance level of 1%. Although the results do 
not exactly mirror the results of the entire pool of respondents, the movement of preference 
between information regimes is the same. The likelihood of US respondents choosing the 
Nicaraguan shirt increased throughout each information regime. 
The final set of models I discuss is the regular multinomial logistical model set. Table 19 shows 
the results of model (8), pertaining to the first information regime. The coefficient on Price is 
negative and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on Nicaragua is positive at 0.73, 
significant at the 5% level. Table 20 shows the results of the second information regime model. 
Price and Tariff are negative at the 1% level for both, while the coefficient on Nicaragua increased 
to 1.97, significant at the 1% level. Meanwhile, the results of the third information regime model 
in Table 21 show that the coefficient on Nicaragua increased yet again to 2.15, also significant at 
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the 1% level. Thus the likelihood of choosing the Nicaraguan shirt increased from the first to the 
second information regime and again from the second to the third information regime. These 
results mirror the results obtained in the second set of models, the conditional logit models with 
no dummy variables. Beginning with the first information regime with no information about the 
shirts other than price, label, and country of origin, respondents’ likelihood of choosing the 
Nicaraguan shirt was positive. Their likelihood of choosing the Nicaraguan shirt increased when 
presented with the breakdown of tariff amount and producer contribution amount. Their likelihood 
of choosing the Nicaraguan shirt increased further when told that the US government planned to 
use import tax revenue towards international aid programs. Essentially, the second and third sets 
of models—conditional logit with no dummy variables and multinomial logit—corroborated each 
other’s findings, in partial contradiction to the results of the first set of models with conditional 
logit and the dummy variable setup.  
As with the previous two model sets, I run the same multinomial logistical regressions limited to 
respondents living in the US. Table 22 shows that the coefficient on Nicaragua in the first 
information regime is positive but not statistically significant, which is the same result obtained in 
the conditional logistical regression of the second model set. In the second information regime, the 
same coefficient increased and is statistically significant at the 1% level (Table 23). Finally, in the 
third information regime, the coefficient increased to 1.64 (from 1.47), again statistically 
significant at the 1% level (Table 24). These results mirror the ones obtained by the second set of 
conditional logistical models: US respondents were effectively indifferent between the US and 
Nicaraguan shirt in the first information regime, then their likelihood of choosing the Nicaraguan 
shirt increased in the second regime, and increased further in the third regime. Despite varying 
levels of statistical significance compared to the overall data set, preferences among US 
respondents move in the same directions as the larger pool of respondents in all three model sets, 
reinforcing the argument that the survey setup is robust enough to capture consumer preferences 
in the US market.  
 
Discussion 
What these results have indicated is that respondents have a preference for the Fairtrade shirt from 
a developing country, even before presenting them with any additional information about where 
their money goes and how it is used. This is an unsurprising result given the profile of the 
respondents, which indicates that they are socially and ethically conscious in general. And yet 
when they are presented with a breakdown of how much of the price of the shirt goes towards the 
producer and how much goes towards a tax, their preference for the Fairtrade shirt becomes even 
stronger. We can infer from this that having access to more information about the product increases 
respondents’ propensity to make charitable purchases, as the underlining cause of the Fairtrade 
labeling program is to improve economic equity in disadvantaged regions of the world. The answer 
to the titular question of this paper is that having more information about tariffs increases the 
overall likelihood that consumers will choose the Fairtrade shirt.  
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This finding helps us understand how preferences change between different levels of information. 
However, one of the economic questions I pose in earlier sections is regarding the balance between 
price and charity and at what point consumers find that the price premium is not worth the purchase 
of a Fairtrade shirt. To answer this, I present additional economic models that involve basic 
demand and inverse demand functions. Figures 7, 8a, and 8b in the appendix show respondents’ 
fitted aggregate demand curves for the Made in Nicaragua shirt for each of the three information 
regimes. The quantity demanded, on the horizontal axis, is determined by the number of 
respondents who picked the Nicaraguan shirt at each of its price levels. For the first information 
regime, this is simply the original three prices of the shirt ($8.49, $8.99, and $9.99). In the survey, 
the second and third information regimes had repeating prices with different tariff and contribution 
levels. For these two regimes, I calculate a “real price” determined by: 
 
Real Price = Original Price – Contribution 
 
This real price is a way of showing the effective price consumers pay which reflects their utility 
of the shirt itself, including tax and minus the charitable component represented by the contribution 
to the producer.  
Figure 9 shows all the fitted aggregate demand curves for the Nicaraguan shirt superimposed on 
one another. The graph makes it easier to see that the demand curve of the first information regime 
is the most inelastic. After being provided with information about tax and contribution breakdown, 
the market demand curve of the second regime becomes more elastic relative to the first regime. 
Finally, after being provided with information about how the government will use the import tax, 
the demand curve of the third information regime becomes slightly more inelastic again relative 
to the second regime, though not as much as the first information regime. Treating each regime as 
a separate market, this means that the quantity demanded by respondents was more responsive to 
changes in price in the second market/regime relative to the first, but became slightly less sensitive 
in the third regime relative to the second. In other words, under the third market where the available 
information to consumers includes both the price breakdown and the government’s plan on how 
to use import tax revenue, any increase or decrease in the price of a Fairtrade, Made in Nicaragua 
shirt will not change the quantity of shirts demanded as much as it would in the second market 
where the only information available to consumers is the price breakdown. 
This analysis of elasticity sets the groundwork of describing how responsive consumers are in 
general to changes in price of the Fairtrade shirt, but to try to specifically pinpoint where in this 
real price range consumers feel the extra money towards the Fairtrade shirt is not worth it, I present 
models akin to inverted demand curves. Additionally, these models also separately include the 
number of US shirts chosen by respondents. Given the nature of market demand and how the 
quantity demanded generally decreases with an increase in price, adding the demand for the US 
shirt into the analysis helps us see at which price level(s) the demand for the Nicaraguan shirt drops 
off and switches over to the US shirt. Figure 10 shows the amount of Nicaraguan shirts chosen vs 
US shirts chosen for the first information regime. Unlike the previously discussed demand curves, 
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this graph has Price on the horizontal axis and Quantity Demanded on the vertical axis. Data points 
for each shirt are plotted with a fitted line for each to estimate their respective linear inverse 
demand curves. Since the US shirt serves as the control in the survey and its price remains constant 
and below the Nicaraguan shirt, I compare both shirts with respect to the price of the Nicaraguan 
shirt as it increases. In the three price levels shown in Figure 10, the number of Nicaraguan shirts 
chosen was higher than US shirts at the first two price levels before preferences switched in favor 
of the US shirt at the $9.99 price level. Using fitted lines to model each shirt’s demand with respect 
to Nicaraguan prices and based on their functional forms, the intersection in the demand of the two 
shirts is at $9.08. This is a 13.64% price premium relative to the price of the US shirt. Based on 
this simple model in the first information regime, respondents as a whole were willing to tolerate 
a Nicaraguan/Fairtrade shirt price up to 13.64% more expensive than the US shirt before switching 
preferences over to the cheaper US, non-labeled shirt. This essentially represents the point where 
the effect of price and its “expensiveness” outweighs the charity factor in consumers’ decision-
making in this market. 
Unlike the first information regime, the second and third information regimes rely on “real prices” 
that discount the producer contribution—or the charitable component—of the purchase in order to 
analyze demand based on the price for the shirt itself (i.e. based on the utility the consumer would 
get from using the shirt separate from the utility the consumer would get from contributing to a 
cause). Figures 11a and 11b show the same inverse demand curves for the second and third 
information regimes, respectively. As with the demand curves for the Nicaraguan shirt, the prices 
in these graphs are calculated with the same formula as the demand curves in Figures 8a and 8b. 
Each graph has five observations at six different price points (two observations at $8.59). Using 
the two fitted demand curves for each shirt and their respective functional forms, the point of 
intersection in the second information regime in Figure 11a is just below the $8.59 price point, 
specifically at $8.56. This represents the point where the preference for the US shirt overtakes that 
of the Nicaragua shirt, given the introduction of information about tariffs and the real prices 
generated from that. This is a 7.13% price premium relative to the price of the US shirt. In Figure 
11b, the intersection point is between the final two price levels, at $8.73—a 9.26% price premium 
relative to the US shirt. In the second regime, respondents were willing to tolerate a Nicaraguan 
shirt price up to 7.13% more expensive than the US shirt whereas they were willing to tolerate up 
to a 9.26% price premium relative to the US shirt in the third regime. Essentially, respondents’ 
willingness to pay a higher price for the Nicaragua shirt increased when told that the US 
government was planning on using the import tax revenue for international development and aid 
programs.  
This result helps corroborate part of the results obtained in statistical model sets 2 and 3. Since the 
second and third information regimes share the same real price levels, we can compare 
respondents’ price premium tolerance levels between the two regimes to see that there was a 2.13 
percentage point increase in this willingness to pay from the second to the third regime. 
Respondents effectively had a higher threshold in the third regime, where their preferences 
switched over to the US shirt at a higher price level compared to the second regime. This 
supplements the earlier statistical results which showed that respondents’ likelihood of choosing 
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the Nicaraguan shirt increased in the third information regime relative to the second, even though 
the two results do not necessarily mean the same thing. 
This leads to the final remaining question of whether consumers have faith in the government 
relative to the free market when it comes to remedying issues such as global income inequality or 
poverty. Results from the second and third information regimes can help answer this. Despite 
results from the first model set showing no difference in preference for the Fairtrade shirt between 
these two regimes, the second and third model sets as well as the analysis from the economic 
models strongly indicate that preference for the Fairtrade shirt increased further in the third 
information regime. I argue that this shows an overall trust for the government and their efforts to 
alleviate global economic issues. The only difference between the two information regimes is the 
additional disclosure of how the government plans to use the import tax revenue from the shirt, in 
the third regime. In response, respondents were more likely to choose the Fairtrade shirt and had 
a higher price tolerance for it. If one did not believe in the government’s ability to help resolve 
these economic issues or did not believe that the government would at least carry them out in good 
faith, their preference for the Fairtrade shirt would most likely stay the same or even decrease. It 
could be argued that the stronger preference for the Fairtrade shirt in the third regime is a given 
since respondents would have already signed away the import tax amounts as a deadweight loss in 
the second information regime and that being later told that there could be at least some usefulness 
to that tax contribution would increase their preference for the Fairtrade shirt. However, I argue 
that this reasonably would not increase their preference for the shirt if they did not actually believe 
that that revenue would be made useful, hence their trusting of the government to make a positive 
contribution to this issue. If respondents truly believed that the government is not capable or 
trustworthy enough to make a positive difference, it is more reasonable to expect that preferences 
would not change even when accounting for the deadweight loss of the tax in the second 
information regime.  
Ultimately what ties everything together is the access and availability of information. Earlier in 
the paper, I hypothesized that respondents may reconsider choosing the Fairtrade shirt when told 
that a portion of the price premium they pay is actually the result of a tariff. However, these results 
imply the opposite. Having more information about where their money goes increases their overall 
confidence and preference for the Fairtrade shirt. The “charity factor” in consumers’ utility 
functions is strong enough that they are willing to purchase the Fairtrade shirt as long as some 
portion of the price premium is going to producers, even if the rest goes towards tax. I argue that 
this serves as evidence in favor of increased transparency in market transactions, particularly ones 
that involve a charitable aspect in the purchase. With more information available, consumers are 
given a better idea of where their money goes and seeing this quantified as they make their 
purchases amplifies the warm glow effect and helps further justify their charitable purchase.  
 
Limitations 
This study is not without its limitations which may affect the applicability and usefulness of the 
results. The first of these is the fact that the survey was conducted among a population of internet 
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users. Due to the widely-connected nature of the internet and social media sites, internet users may 
be more socially and ethically conscious relative to the general population. This could mean that 
respondents are predisposed towards choosing Fairtrade-labeled goods and thus preferences would 
be skewed towards labeled products. A possible future step in the research would be to replicate 
the study among consumers in the general population. Another limitation is self-reported data. 
Since respondents are the ones indicating what their choices would be in hypothetical 
circumstances, there is no certainty that they are being truthful and that the choices they indicate 
in their response reflect their actual consumer spending habits and choices. Related to this issue is 
the problem of surveys and selection bias, since respondents are people who elected to take the 
survey voluntarily and may not represent the views of the general population. One other possible 
source of concern about the general study is the effectiveness of the survey in conveying 
information and respondents subsequently taking them into account when answering the questions. 
For instance, the distinction between the data in the second and third information regimes comes 
only from the fact that the third information regime provided additional written information about 
how the government will use the income tax from one shirt. For the differences in the two data 
groups to mean anything, it is necessary that respondents have read and understood the statements 
and the provided information and incorporated that into their subsequent choices. Even making 
the statements stand out visually and expressing them clearly is no guarantee that respondents will 
choose to read and use the provided information; this issue essentially stems back to the problems 
regarding self-reported data. A related problem is the issue of shirt characteristic endogeneity and 
that respondents may have preconceived ideas about certain characteristics of the shirts based on 
other variables, despite the preface to the questions making clear that any information not provided 
is assumed to be the same. For example, the quality of the two shirts is not a characteristic I specify 
in the survey (it is assumed to be the same between both shirts), but respondents may come to the 
table believing that one shirt will be of higher quality than the other based on a different 
characteristic I mention (e.g. a shirt made in the US will be a higher quality product than one made 
in Nicaragua). Aside from changes in survey designs to mitigate these issues, other possible ways 
to modify the research in the future could include changing the methodology entirely and 
conducting a study based on consumer and market data which might be obtainable.  
 
Conclusion 
As people become more exposed to social and ethical issues in the world today, foundations and 
programs such as Fairtrade play an increasingly prominent role in consumer markets. However, 
there is still a lack of clarity on the consumer’s end about how the money is used and how much 
of it benefits economically disadvantaged people. This study provides evidence that giving 
consumers more detailed price breakdowns and more information about the use of product revenue 
increases their preference for an ethically sourced product that makes some socially and 
economically conscious contribution. The warm glow effect and the positive utility they receive 
from making a charitable purchase is particularly strong and knowing more about how much of a 
premium is taxed does not inhibit their preference, but rather justifies it since they can see that at 
least some portion goes towards disadvantaged producers. On top of this, consumers place a 
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notable amount of trust in the government to help solve these socioeconomic issues by indicating 
an even stronger preference for charitable purchases when told that the government will use the 
import tax revenue generated towards international development aid. The availability of 
information in the market plays a pivotal role, and there is a case for organizations whether private 
or public to pay greater attention to this factor when forming their policies and practices.  
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Appendix A: Tables and Figures  
 
 
   Figure 1a: Gender Distribution         Figure 1b: Human Rights Group Membership 
               
 
Figure 1c: Age Distribution  
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Figure 1d: Education Distribution  
 
 
Figure 2: Social Issues Respondents Care About 
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Figure 3: Important factors when making a purchase 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Familiarity with Fairtrade label 
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Figure 5: Annual budget for purchasing shirts 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Average number of t-shirts purchased yearly  
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Table 1: Clogit regression for first data subset with no information  
 
 
Table 2: Clogit regression for first data subset with information  
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Table 3: Clogit regression for second data subset with no information  
 
 
Table 4: Clogit regression for second data subset with information  
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Table 5: Clogit regression for first model of first subset but with USA instead of Nicaragua 
 
 
Table 6: Clogit regression for second model of first subset, with USA instead of Nicaragua 
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Table 7: Clogit regression for first model of second subset, with USA instead of Nicaragua  
 
 
Table 8: Clogit regression for second model of second subset, with USA instead of Nicaragua 
 
  
27 
 
Table 9: Clogit regression for first model of first subset, limited to US residents 
 
 
Table 10: Clogit regression for second model of first subset, limited to US residents 
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Table 11: Clogit regression for first model of second subset, limited to US residents 
 
 
Table 12: Clogit regression for second model of second subset, limited to US residents  
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Table 13: Clogit regression for first information regime 
 
 
Table 14: Clogit regression for second information regime 
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Table 15: Clogit regression for third information regime 
 
 
Table 16: Clogit regression for first information regime, limited to US residents 
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Table 17: Clogit regression for second information regime, limited to US residents  
 
 
Table 18: Clogit regression for third information regime, limited to US residents  
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Table 19: Regular logit regression for first information regime 
 
 
Table 20: Regular logit regression for second information regime 
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Table 21: Regular logit regression for third information regime 
 
 
Table 22: Regular logit regression for first information regime, limited to US residents  
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Table 23: Regular logit regression for second information regime, limited to US residents  
 
 
Table 24: Regular logit regression for third information regime, limited to US residents  
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Figure 7: Aggregate demand curve for Made in Nicaragua shirt 
 
 
Figure 8a: Aggregate demand curve for Made in Nicaragua shirt 
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Figure 8b: Aggregate demand for Made in Nicaragua shirt  
 
 
Figure 9: Aggregate demand for Made in Nicaragua shirt, all three information regimes 
 
  
37 
 
Figure 10: Respondents’ choice between the two shirts (relative to Nicaraguan shirt price) 
 
 
Figure 11a: Respondents’ choice between the two shirts (relative to Nicaraguan shirt price) 
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Figure 11b: Respondents’ choice between the two shirts (relative to Nicaraguan shirt price) 
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Appendix B: The Survey 
 
  
40 
 
 
  
41 
 
 
  
42 
 
 
  
43 
 
 
  
44 
 
 
45 
 
 
